"Now, Indiana Attorney General Curtis Hill is asking the United States Supreme Court to accept a case that originated in West Virginia, Shaquille Robinson vs US, and urging SCOTUS to create a similar rule for the country as a whole that Indiana adopted in the Pinner case."
If SCOTUS takes this case and rules similar to Pinner that would give de facto Constitutional Carry for the whole country
No, it would just mean that mere possession of a firearm alone would not justify either a stop or a frisk - an officer would have to have some additional basis to believe a person was engaged in criminal activity or constituted a danger to the officer. Along those lines - Robinson wasn't a "stop" case - it was only a search case, because there was a valid reason for the police officers to pull over the car based on neither the driver nor Robinson wearing seat belts. The question was whether the mere report that Robinson (or someone matching his description) had a firearm was sufficient for the officer to believe that Robinson presented a danger to the officer so as to justify the search of Robinson for the weapon. (An additional fact supporting the search was that the location where Robinson was seen loading a gun and putting it in his pocket was known an area where there was a lot of illegal drug activity.)
Pinner was a bit different, since it was not a traffic stop. The court held that the "investigatory stop" of Pinner (who was seated on a bench in a movie theater lobby at the time) was illegal - and thus the subsequent search of Pinner was illegal) - because the police officers only had a tip that Pinner was armed and did not have any other reason to believe that Pinner was either a danger to the officer or engaged in criminal activity. So if SCOTUS takes the Robinson case and adopts a rule similar to Pinner for both "stops" and "frisks," they would say that the mere presence of a firearm does not justify either a stop or a frisk without some additional reason to believe a person is either engaged in criminal activity (including some basis to believe the person's possession of a gun is illegal) or that the person constitutes a danger to the officer.
The real problem with the Robinson decision is that the 4th Circuit said that even the LAWFUL possession of a firearm gives a police officer a reasonable basis to believe the armed person is a danger to the officer, which justifies a search. That's what we're trying to fix.
Guy
Pinner was a bit different, since it was not a traffic stop.
....
Guy Relford? His mother was a hamster and his father smelt of elderberries.
No, it would just mean that mere possession of a firearm alone would not justify either a stop or a frisk - an officer would have to have some additional basis to believe a person was engaged in criminal activity or constituted a danger to the officer. Along those lines - Robinson wasn't a "stop" case - it was only a search case, because there was a valid reason for the police officers to pull over the car based on neither the driver nor Robinson wearing seat belts. The question was whether the mere report that Robinson (or someone matching his description) had a firearm was sufficient for the officer to believe that Robinson presented a danger to the officer so as to justify the search of Robinson for the weapon. (An additional fact supporting the search was that the location where Robinson was seen loading a gun and putting it in his pocket was known as an area where there was a lot of illegal drug activity.)
Pinner was a bit different, since it was not a traffic stop. The court held that the "investigatory stop" of Pinner (who was seated on a bench in a movie theater lobby at the time) was illegal (and thus the subsequent search of Pinner was illegal) - because the police officers only had a tip that Pinner was armed and did not have any other reason to believe that Pinner was either a danger to the officer or engaged in criminal activity. So if SCOTUS takes the Robinson case and adopts a rule similar to Pinner for both "stops" and "frisks," they would say that the mere presence of a firearm does not justify either a stop or a frisk without some additional reason to believe a person is either engaged in criminal activity (including some basis to believe the person's possession of a gun is illegal) or that the person constitutes a danger to the officer.
The real problem with the Robinson decision is that the 4th Circuit said that even the LAWFUL possession of a firearm gives a police officer a reasonable basis to believe the armed person is a danger to the officer, which justifies a search. That's really what we're trying to fix.
Guy