Boeing 737 + Congressman Carson = misery

[churchmouse]

So much wisdom, the Mouse has. Follow the green, Carson will.

Lead eye hit it as well.

A lot of great info in here as always.

 

[KLB]

I get that there may have been a defect. No argument....but the media and certain parts of the government seem to be treating this like Boeing was actively trying to crash as many airplanes as possible.

This does not make sense....but gets headlines.

As for Takata, again, the issue was not it knowingly putting out bad product. It was in trying to cover up the breadth of the problems after the defects were discovered.

From what I am reading they knew as early as 2000 there was an issue, yet the first model year recalled was 2002.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/...-ruptures-as-early-as-2000.html?module=inline

 

[BugI02]

You think that corporations haven't done something like this? Does Takata ring a bell?

This would be worse than any other I can think of, but it would not be something unheard of. They may just have underestimated the actual risk.

Second time you've gone here. Takata was a beta engineering fault as well. The inflators had to be exposed to humidity as well as thermal cycling for extended periods of time to exhibit the failure mode, and the failure mode was only determined after the fact. It did not show up in product testing. Unless you think the fact the manufacturer [STRIKE]didn't[/STRIKE] couldn't test all conceivable variables along all possible timelines is evidence of their evil intent

 

[2A_Tom]

So, our beloved congressman from Indianapolis thinks he is an expert, because he got put on a committee. He thinks this gives him The ability to speak about something for which he has absolutely no understanding.

Which is the default position of nearly every politician on every committee ever, not to mention 94.9% of bureaucrats.

 

[avboiler11]

Media and politicians:



I’m an airline pilot (don’t fly 737s) and the MCAS system on the 737 MAX was not properly discussed and trained as a difference from the 737NG. That falls 100% on Boeing.

The system’s operation is overly complicated, has a single point of failure, and allows an airplane to get out of trim so badly physical force cannot overcome it. Such a system NEVER should have been certified like that.

That said, hitting the Stab Cutout Switches on the pedestal would have deactivated the system...and is generally a memory item for Runaway Trim.

Not gonna put this on the crews though; reportedly the Ethiopian Captain was a very good, competent pilot.

 

[DoggyDaddy]

I'll wait until more info gets out before forming an opinion and I've got a few thousand hours stick time. Congressman Carson's opinion [STRIKE]right now[/STRIKE] doesn't mean much [STRIKE]other than as a performance in front of big media.[/STRIKE]

FIFY...

 

[Hoosierkav]

Did anyone help finance this project? Wells Fargo perhaps? Should they be on the hook for providing funding for a plane that could have issues?

(I'm asking on behalf of Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez' office)

 

[KLB]

Second time you've gone here. Takata was a beta engineering fault as well. The inflators had to be exposed to humidity as well as thermal cycling for extended periods of time to exhibit the failure mode, and the failure mode was only determined after the fact. It did not show up in product testing. Unless you think the fact the manufacturer [STRIKE]didn't[/STRIKE] couldn't test all conceivable variables along all possible timelines is evidence of their evil intent

How then do you explain the testimony in court that they were hiding it in 2000?

From the article I posted

But on Friday, testimony in a Florida court showed that Takata’s own engineers discarded evidence that may have shown otherwise as long as 16 years ago. As early as 2000, around the time the propellant, which includes a compound called ammonium nitrate, was introduced into Takata models, failures occurred during internal testing.

And more

Takata did not report the failures to Honda, according to court documents. Instead, it manipulated data to hide results that showed the propellant could combust violently, causing its casing — called an inflater — to overpressurize and rupture, according to the documents. In several instances, “pressure vessel failures,” or airbag ruptures, were reported to Honda as normal airbag deployments, the documents said.

 

[BugI02]

Not quite as cut and dried as you make it seem, looks like there are some unindicted co-conspirators. But you're right, Takata is dirty too

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/business/takata-airbags-automakers-class-action.html
Automakers Knew of Takata Airbag Hazard for Years, Suit Says

At least four automakers knew for years that Takata’s airbags were dangerous and could rupture violently but continued to use those airbags in their vehicles to save on costs, lawyers representing victims of the defect asserted in a court document filed on Monday.


The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into Takata’s rupture-prone airbags has so far painted automakers as unwitting victims duped by a rogue supplier that manipulated safety data to hide a deadly defect, linked to at least 11 deaths and over 100 injuries in the United States.


But the fresh allegations against Ford, Honda, Nissan and Toyota, made as part of a class-action lawsuit in Florida and based on company documents, point to a far deeper involvement by automakers that used Takata’s defective airbags for years.

The filing by the plaintiffs says emails and internal documents turned over by Honda show that in 1999 and 2000, the automaker was intimately involved in developing a problematic propellant, or explosive, used in Takata’s airbags. The propellant is housed in a steel container called the inflater, which in the Takata case can rupture, shooting metal fragments toward the car’s driver or passengers.


That propellant, based on a volatile compound, raised concerns internally at Takata at the time, and long plagued the company’s engineers. During testing of Takata’s inflaters in 1999 and 2000 at Honda’s own facilities, at least two inflaters ruptured, according to the filing. Still, Honda pushed a particularly problematic configuration of the propellant over Takata’s objections, the filing said. Honda chose Takata’s airbags because of their relative “inexpensiveness,” the filing quoted Honda documents as saying.

The filing also cites internal documents from Ford, Nissan and Toyota indicating that cost considerations influenced the automakers’ decision to adopt Takata’s airbags in the early 2000s, despite safety concerns.


Toyota used Takata’s airbags “primarily” for cost reasons, even though the automaker had “large quality concerns” about Takata and considered the supplier’s quality performance “unacceptable,” the filing said. In 2003, a Takata inflater ruptured at a Toyota facility during testing, the court filing said.


In 2005, Nissan began investigating the use of adding a drying agent to Takata’s airbag inflaters out of concern that exposure to moisture made the propellant particularly unstable, the filing says. Takata engineers had long known that its explosive was sensitive to moisture and adopted it despite internal concerns over its safety. Although patents show that its engineers have long struggled to tame the propellant, the company still maintains that the explosive can be stabilized to withstand moist conditions.


Ford chose Takata’s inflaters over the objections of the automaker’s own inflater expert, who opposed the use of Takata’s propellant because of its instability and sensitivity to moisture, the filing said. Ford overrode those objections because it thought Takata was the only supplier that could provide the large number of inflaters Ford needed, the filing says.

Cheaper to litigate the claims (and settle under non-disclosure) than to acknowledge the defect. Where have we seen that before? *cough* Pinto

Takata is now a zombie corporation, kept alive by its keiretsu to be the fall guy

 

[Vigilant]

While I don't know the whole story, it does seem like Boeing wanted to take a short cut with the 737 MAX and instead of it requiring full type certification to fly it, they just tacked it onto the original 737 and made it supplemental. By installing larger more powerful engines, and moving them forward and higher for ground clearance, they changed the flight characteristics of the aircraft. During takeoff the aircraft would pitch up slightly more than the standard 737,

Instead of making pilots go through a full learning curve of the new airframe, they just required a little "home schooling" and hope it would seen that the pilots would notice that little extra switch and lines of code that prevent that extra pitch up. Here is where the problem started. If the angle of attack indicator was at the high end of it's calibration, or it failed, the aircraft computer would try to lower the nose to pick up speed. If the pilot was requesting the extra angle of climb, the plane computer would fight the pilot and try to lower the nose. Of course the obvious question is how easy it was to find the switch to turn the computer off and let the pilot fly the plane? And were pilots schooled enough to know about the design changes and resulting software and switch?

And yes, regardless as to how many hours the captain has, a first officer with 200 hours is crazy.

Type ratings across the board are pretty much like that, fly one Cessna Citation, a little course, and you fly another, another, and another. Never mind AVboiler splained it better than I could.

 

[KLB]

Not quite as cut and dried as you make it seem, looks like there are some unindicted co-conspirators. But you're right, Takata is dirty too

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/business/takata-airbags-automakers-class-action.html
Automakers Knew of Takata Airbag Hazard for Years, Suit Says













Cheaper to litigate the claims (and settle under non-disclosure) than to acknowledge the defect. Where have we seen that before? *cough* Pinto

Takata is now a zombie corporation, kept alive by its keiretsu to be the fall guy

Damn. Talk about a rabbit hole. Corporations seem to make those monetary decisions too often. It is pretty cold to say it is better to let people get killed or maimed and we will just pay the lawsuits instead of fixing our stuff.

 

[avboiler11]

Type ratings across the board are pretty much like that, fly one Cessna Citation, a little course, and you fly another, another, and another. Never mind AVboiler splained it better than I could.

Yeah, kind of amazing you could do initial training on a Citation I and be qualified to fly an Encore+, or a CitationJet to a CJ4.

Then again, I suppose going from a 737-200 Thunder Guppy to a 737 Max 10 is just as bad if not worse...

 

[BugI02]

Damn. Talk about a rabbit hole. Corporations seem to make those monetary decisions too often. It is pretty cold to say it is better to let people get killed or maimed and we will just pay the lawsuits instead of fixing our stuff.

Yeah, I knew Takata was a sock-puppet for Honda; but I thought Honda was making the best of a situation they just got caught up in. Until I read your cite I wasn't aware of just how early they knew they had a problem, then while checking further I came across the ongoing litigation. While taking much of what a lawyer says in a multi-million dollar liability lawsuit with a grain of salt, when I read that they had company documents to back up the claims I realized Soichiro would be appalled at what they have become

Another source stated that when Honda reported the first few (2004 - 07) failures to the NHTSA, they reported them as 'malfunctions' or 'abnormal airbag deployments' and not catastrophic failures. I was also not aware until recently that Honda had pushed Takata to switch to ammonium nitrate inflators from the mature technology (sodium azide) against their better judgement. So much fail

 

[HoughMade]

Damn. Talk about a rabbit hole. Corporations seem to make those monetary decisions too often. It is pretty cold to say it is better to let people get killed or maimed and we will just pay the lawsuits instead of fixing our stuff.

...and there's still a difference between knowingly placing a dangerous product in production and trying to limit liability once it is out there. I am not defending any specific actions- I am saying that there is a difference.

 

[KLB]

...and there's still a difference between knowingly placing a dangerous product in production and trying to limit liability once it is out there. I am not defending any specific actions- I am saying that there is a difference.

Of course there is. It just isn't always clear which is happening.

Some products are sold and the companies have no idea of the issues they will cause in the beginning, like Asbestos or cigarettes.

Some are known to have issues before they are sold, like the airbags above.

The question is, which category does Boeing fall into. How much did they know about whatever is going on before? How much are they just trying to cover their butts now?

I certainly hope that they did not knowingly sell those planes with an issue that played a real role in them crashing. I just do not have any real confidence that they would not.

 

[BigRed]

We have known since its inception that the [STRIKE]FAA [/STRIKE]federal government is useless, but we've all put up with it. Now they're going to continue to be useless, but also a much larger pain in the ass.

Fixed it for you.

 

[SheepDog4Life]

Media and politicians:

View attachment 75773

I’m an airline pilot (don’t fly 737s) and the MCAS system on the 737 MAX was not properly discussed and trained as a difference from the 737NG. That falls 100% on Boeing.

The system’s operation is overly complicated, has a single point of failure, and allows an airplane to get out of trim so badly physical force cannot overcome it. Such a system NEVER should have been certified like that.

That said, hitting the Stab Cutout Switches on the pedestal would have deactivated the system...and is generally a memory item for Runaway Trim.

Not gonna put this on the crews though; reportedly the Ethiopian Captain was a very good, competent pilot.

AVBoiler, respectfully, I disagree.

From what I have read, and I rely mostly on AOPA articles, the procedure for neutralizing runaway trim has been the same on every 737 since the first one delivered in the 60's.

Though the MCAS feature was new, pilot training to neutralize runaway trim on any 737 is not. It's not fly-by-wire, the trim motor (actually motors, there's a back up) physically "spins" the trim wheels and the trim setting is visible to both seats.

In an "unexplained" nose up/down situation, I would expect a competent 737 pilot to be looking at the trim settings IMMEDIATELY. And, if the systems continued to put the trim into unacceptable positions, to "turn it off". The STAB TRIM cutoff switches (main and backup) are on the center console, accessible to both pilots.

The Lion Air crew "fought" the trim for 10 minutes prior to crashing.

The Ethiopian Air crew for several minutes prior to crashing.

IMO, those crews were not competent to be flying 737's, and most importantly, those airlines did not adequately train their aircrews. Expect the Ethiopian investigators to point the finger at Boeing, however, since the government owns both the airline and the investigative body.

Additionally, after the Lion Air crash in October, Boeing issued an Operation Manual Bulletin November 6, 2018, on EXACTLY this issue, the cause, and how to safely resume normal flight.

The first crash, Lion Air, should never have occurred, IMO, with any competent 737 (note, MAX 8 left off on purpose) crew. Anyone competent to fly any 737 variant. Any airline that doesn't train their crews to that level of competency is inherently unsafe, IMO. This is 737 emergency procedures 101, again IMO.

Second, that Ethiopian Air, and the pilots themselves, apparently ignored the lessons of the Lion Air crash, and the Boeing OMB, is IMO, criminal. How can an airline operate a plane, or a pilot fly it, without being aware of the cause of a fatal crash. Yes, criminal both figuratively and literally.

tl;dr: Any competent 737 pilot should have been able to return to safe flight in seconds. The basic procedure to do so has been the same since the first 737 flew in the late 60's. Any airline that doesn't train their crews to this basic level of competency is unsafe.

ETA: On November 7, 2018, the day after Boeing issued the OMB, the FAA issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive, link below. Again, how an airline or pilot operating a 737 MAX 8 could ignore these is beyond me.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_G...25833e0070a070/$FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf

 

[avboiler11]

AVBoiler, respectfully, I disagree.

Are you a recreational or professional pilot? Knowing your background knowledge will help tailor my response.

Many of the articles written by AOPA are by very competent pilots, with a great deal of aviation experience....who don't fly airliners for a living. As such, it is easy to snipe from the comfort of one's chair instead of fighting an issue in the aircraft.

For example: MCAS does not present like a classic runaway trim situation with the big Boeing trim wheel clattering away; this is VERY important when it comes to training primacy. MCAS can be stopped via opposite trim switch input...but after a few seconds starts trimming again. Additionally, it has been determined MCAS has five times the control authority it was designed for. Boeing did not feel it necessary to include this system, which was not on NGs and is new to the MAX, which clearly can activate from a single point of failure by a faulty AOA reading (important sidebar: why dafuq are new airliners suddenly having AOA failures, and why did Boeing only design the MAX with input from one AOA?), in the FCOM.

That's a significant problem that falls squarely on the manufacturer.

Could crews thinking faster in the situation have hit the switches and saved the day? Very possibly; the day before the Lion Air crash the airplane had a similar issue but a jumpseating pilot hit the stab trim cutoffs and deactivated the system. Of course that goes back to what is widely known in aviation- pilots facing a severe abnormal can 'gunsight' in, where somebody sitting a little further away from the panel can see things that pilots in the heat of battle cannot. In the old days that was a flight engineer, today its nobody...

 

[BugI02]

I'm quite aware how easy it is to critique things with my ass safely in a chair on the ground, but I am startled that asymmetric stick shaker activation (Capt's side only) at rotation continuing throughout initial climb out and subsequent flight did not cause more concern

 

[BehindBlueI's]

You think that corporations haven't done something like this? Does Takata ring a bell?

This would be worse than any other I can think of, but it would not be something unheard of. They may just have underestimated the actual risk.

GM continuing to sell cars it knew the ignition switches were faulty on, resulting in the car turning off during operation and traffic deaths?
Purdue Pharma's "Project Tango" and opioid makers' admissions in court that their recommended dosage was designed to breed addiction?
Bayer continuing to sell blood products it knew was infecting thousands of users with HIV?
Sig selling guns on the civilian market it knew would fire if dropped in a certain way, while fixing the issue for the military trial guns?
The peanut butter company that knew their product tested positive for salmonella but shipped it anyway (causing the company's eventual bankruptcy and prison sentences for several of the execs)?
The Chinese toy makers knowingly using lead paint on toddler's toys? Or, for that matter, American companies promoting lead paint as healthy even though they knew it was poisonous: https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/18-84-opinion-below.pdf

Short term profits, employees/execs hiding mistakes so they don't get in trouble, the assumption you won't get caught, shifting blame to consumers...not like any of this is unheard of. I have no idea if the plane in question is dangerous or not and don't have the background to have a valid opinion. Not like there isn't precedent though.