Boeing 737 + Congressman Carson = misery

[SheepDog4Life]

Are you a recreational or professional pilot? Knowing your background knowledge will help tailor my response.

Many of the articles written by AOPA are by very competent pilots, with a great deal of aviation experience....who don't fly airliners for a living. As such, it is easy to snipe from the comfort of one's chair instead of fighting an issue in the aircraft.

For example: MCAS does not present like a classic runaway trim situation with the big Boeing trim wheel clattering away; this is VERY important when it comes to training primacy. MCAS can be stopped via opposite trim switch input...but after a few seconds starts trimming again. Additionally, it has been determined MCAS has five times the control authority it was designed for. Boeing did not feel it necessary to include this system, which was not on NGs and is new to the MAX, which clearly can activate from a single point of failure by a faulty AOA reading (important sidebar: why dafuq are new airliners suddenly having AOA failures, and why did Boeing only design the MAX with input from one AOA?), in the FCOM.

That's a significant problem that falls squarely on the manufacturer.

Could crews thinking faster in the situation have hit the switches and saved the day? Very possibly; the day before the Lion Air crash the airplane had a similar issue but a jumpseating pilot hit the stab trim cutoffs and deactivated the system. Of course that goes back to what is widely known in aviation- pilots facing a severe abnormal can 'gunsight' in, where somebody sitting a little further away from the panel can see things that pilots in the heat of battle cannot. In the old days that was a flight engineer, today its nobody...

AVB, I do agree with almost everything you say here, including that MCAS was not designed/implemented well, that eliminating the flight engineer was cost over safety, etc.

However, the MCAS/AOA issue does manifest with the STAB TRIB motors engaging and spinning the trim wheel and the trim position is readily visible. It is complicated by the fact that the trim switch temporally allows override, but only temporarily, only to return 10 seconds later.

I still maintain that, even allowing a rinse-repeat or two with the trim switch, a competent crew would determine the WHAT, and flip the STAB TRIM cut-out switches, and leave determining the WHY for after safe flight resumed.

I also think that Ethiopian Airlines and their crew, ignoring or being ignorant of the AD and OMB of this specific issue after the Lion Air crash, illustrates that developing world airlines are not up to par on safety.

 

[SheepDog4Life]

So, take this with a grain of salt as it isn't "official" transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder for the Lion Air flight crash in October. But, if correct, that the crew fought "unexplained" nose down conditions for 10 minutes and never looked at the trim position, that is indicting.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/20/coc...r-fix-sources-say.html?recirc=taboolainternal

"They didn't seem to know the trim was moving down," the third source said. "They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about."

 

[BugI02]

I also think it was a liability for that flight that the only pilot with correctly functioning controls and indicators (the co-pilot side) was a 200 hour pilot and likely to be of little help

 

[SheepDog4Life]

I also think it was a liability for that flight that the only pilot with correctly functioning controls and indicators (the co-pilot side) was a 200 hour pilot and likely to be of little help

Do you have a link for this? That the pilot side controls were inoperable or not functioning correctly? I believe this may be conflated with the failed AOA sensor.

I completely agree that a newly minted commercial pilot was in the right seat (co-pilot). In the US, this might earn him a right seat on a puddle-jumper.

The failed (or incorrectly installed or calibrated) AOA sensor was the pilot side sensor and presumably showed a nose-up AOA in excess of stall, in disagreement with the attitude indicated on the primary flight display.

 

[jwamplerusa]

We always do our own engine testing. Certification is just getting an FAA auditor to sign off on our reports. The only time I got push back from the FAA was typographical errors in my report. The technical aspects of what I was doing really wasn't a concern for him.

Maybe control systems get more scrutiny, but structural reports are stamped as certified, so long as we say our in house analysis checked all the boxes. Having said that, we always strive to put the best possible product on the market.

In this instance, I think that what we'll find is that control systems and purchasing were both pushed internally to release things they were not 100% satisfied with, but let them go knowing that the system could be bypassed if necessary. Whoever makes that ****ty AOA sensor needs to be put on blast along with the purchasing manager who approved it. I have sooooo much experience with good designs being ruined by cheap components.

As with most things, multiple failure needed to occur.

1) Sensor malfunction
2) Sensor redundancy not programmed properly
3) Pilot training insufficient to override the system

ATOMonkey, I think we might have a hook to the same industry. What ATOMonkey said times 10.

My concern is that much like the type certification of the DC9 and its horizontal stabilizer jack screw, which didn't raise its head until the Alaska airlines accident off the West coast, there will be more baggage found in Boeing's certification and the FAA's acceptance of their data and validation testing before this is all over.

With the for going said however; my conversations with pilot trainers who have worked in the asia region suggest that for the lion air crash pilot, competency certainly could have been a portion of the issue. And that is buttressed by the prior flight having been saved by the third pilot in the jump seat.

This is like way to not end well for Boeing, or the FAA, and it probably shouldn't.

Has monkey said however, it's all too likely the only thing the industry will get out of this is more worthless regulation pain in expense.

 

[BugI02]

You're reading too much into it,SD4L; though maybe my choice of 'controls' was too strong a word - perhaps instrumentation would have been better. Reports on the released FDR information indicate the captain's stick-shaker (which vibrates the control wheel/column to indicate proximity to a stall condition and operates off the AoA sensor primarily) was in continuous operation from rotation until the crash. The co-pilot's was performing normally, as was his AoA indicator

On segments just preceding the crash, a number of warnings were also received (IAS DISAGREE, SPEED TRIM FAIL, and MACH TRIM FAIL) and the crew on a previous leg considered the Captain's Primary Flight Display to be unreliable because of this. There are indications that the Captain on 610 had some concern in this area because he asked ATC to verify both his speed (which would be groundspeed) and altitude

You'll note that

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-...ort-lion-air-flight-610-raises-more-questions

In response to KNKT’s findings, Boeing issued its own statement on Wednesday and said the report not only failed to include installation records of the AOA sensor replaced before the October 28 flight but also failed to indicate whether the sensor was new or refurbished.

At least in this country, the a/c logbook would contain not only the squawks from previous legs but what maintenance had done to correct the problem and return the a/c to service. I'm seeing a lot made of the fact the crews for the preceding problem legs did not adequately communicate the problems to the crew on the crash leg, but (again referencing US standards) that logbook is in the cockpit (they can't leave without it) or is available in some cases in electronic form. I am not personally familiar with any Captain that would not review all recent entries to that document before flight. If the Lion Air Captain did so he should not have been caught completely unawares

https://news.aviation-safety.net/20...ry-report-on-jt610-boeing-737-max-8-accident/

 

[SheepDog4Life]

You're reading too much into it,SD4L; though maybe my choice of 'controls' was too strong a word - perhaps instrumentation would have been better. Reports on the released FDR information indicate the captain's stick-shaker (which vibrates the control wheel/column to indicate proximity to a stall condition and operates off the AoA sensor primarily) was in continuous operation from rotation until the crash. The co-pilot's was performing normally, as was his AoA indicator

On segments just preceding the crash, a number of warnings were also received (IAS DISAGREE, SPEED TRIM FAIL, and MACH TRIM FAIL) and the crew on a previous leg considered the Captain's Primary Flight Display to be unreliable because of this. There are indications that the Captain on 610 had some concern in this area because he asked ATC to verify both his speed (which would be groundspeed) and altitude

You'll note that

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-...ort-lion-air-flight-610-raises-more-questions



At least in this country, the a/c logbook would contain not only the squawks from previous legs but what maintenance had done to correct the problem and return the a/c to service. I'm seeing a lot made of the fact the crews for the preceding problem legs did not adequately communicate the problems to the crew on the crash leg, but (again referencing US standards) that logbook is in the cockpit (they can't leave without it) or is available in some cases in electronic form. I am not personally familiar with any Captain that would not review all recent entries to that document before flight. If the Lion Air Captain did so he should not have been caught completely unawares

https://news.aviation-safety.net/20...ry-report-on-jt610-boeing-737-max-8-accident/

Thank you, BugI. Very good sources!!! Looking for an authoritative source to verify the quote below from NYT... the manual trim graph from the FDR in the links you provided seem to strongly support it:

In the Lion Air crash, pilots used the thumb switch more than two dozen times to try to override the system. The system kept engaging nonetheless, most likely because of bad readings from a sensor, until the plane crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people on board.

Despite repeatedly, temporarily, overriding trim controls (and it appears they also manually spun the trim wheel dozens of times to correct the trim), the flight crew never made use of the STAB TRIM cut-out switches, the standard response for runaway trim.

I'm firm in my opinion, these were not competently trained 737 pilots.

 

[DoggyDaddy]

Well this is unfortunate for Boeing...

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-new...kes-emergency-landing-orlando-airport-n987691

 

[Hohn]

Boeing wants to push an airplane it knows is dangerously defective into the marketplace so that it will be found liable for every crash and have its reputation permanently damaged because?.....

Don't go ruining this with perfectly sound reasoning.

 

[BugI02]

Well this is unfortunate for Boeing...

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-new...kes-emergency-landing-orlando-airport-n987691

Precautionary shutdown of #2 engine due to over temp indications. Nothing to do with Boeing or MCAS, possibly something for CFM Int'l to be concerned about

But given the current news environment, you are correct; any bad news involving any product is unfortunate for Boeing

 

[BugI02]

Thank you, BugI. Very good sources!!! Looking for an authoritative source to verify the quote below from NYT... the manual trim graph from the FDR in the links you provided seem to strongly support it:



Despite repeatedly, temporarily, overriding trim controls (and it appears they also manually spun the trim wheel dozens of times to correct the trim), the flight crew never made use of the STAB TRIM cut-out switches, the standard response for runaway trim.

I'm firm in my opinion, these were not competently trained 737 pilots.

Yeah, I see people dwelling on the financial motivation for Boeing to duck and weave, but not much coverage of the financial reasons that Lion Air would like it to be all Boeings fault


Ethiopian Airlines is a horse of a different color. They have a dedicated MAX simulator and claim all pilots were well trained. There have been scandals before about airlines using unapproved/counterfeit parts on a/c, either wittingly or unwittingly. I'll be interested if they also had any MX activity centered around the AoA indicators

 

[hoosierdoc]

Gee, sounds like the pharmaceutical industry. We demand better and better! What?! A problem? Evil company killing us!

 

[BugI02]

Gee, sounds like the pharmaceutical industry. We demand better and better! What?! A problem? Evil company killing us!

Sorry, Doc; that's too big a stretch for me

I don't see any evidence of airplane manufacturers 1) Manipulating test data to downplay lethal defects (rofecoxib) 2) Aggressively pushing products known to be potentially harmful to many users (oxycodone) 3) Pursuing a lifetime of treatment at the expense of researching a cure (statins) or 4) Profiteering on mature technology at the possibly fatal expense of its customers (near doubling of the cost of insulin, quintupling of the cost of epipens etc)

 

[mkubancsek]

Somewhere at the statehouse, Carson is assembling a crew of staffers to brief him on what airplanes are and how they work. "So, Senator, remember they are in the sky. They go fast by the clouds."

 

[Hohn]

Sorry, Doc; that's too big a stretch for me

I don't see any evidence of airplane manufacturers 1) Manipulating test data to downplay lethal defects (rofecoxib) 2) Aggressively pushing products known to be potentially harmful to many users (oxycodone) 3) Pursuing a lifetime of treatment at the expense of researching a cure (statins) or 4) Profiteering on mature technology at the possibly fatal expense of its customers (near doubling of the cost of insulin, quintupling of the cost of epipens etc)

OUCH. I think that assertion of a parallel to big pharma can be considered rebutted.

 

[SheepDog4Life]

Yeah, I see people dwelling on the financial motivation for Boeing to duck and weave, but not much coverage of the financial reasons that Lion Air would like it to be all Boeings fault


Ethiopian Airlines is a horse of a different color. They have a dedicated MAX simulator and claim all pilots were well trained. There have been scandals before about airlines using unapproved/counterfeit parts on a/c, either wittingly or unwittingly. I'll be interested if they also had any MX activity centered around the AoA indicators

My criticism of Ethiopian Airlines and crew is even harsher... they had the benefit of the FAA AD and the Boeing OMB post Lion Air.

How can an airline or their crew fly a
plane and not not know about the crash just 5-6 months prior?

 

[ATOMonkey]

My criticism of Ethiopian Airlines and crew is even harsher... they had the benefit of the FAA AD and the Boeing OMB post Lion Air.

How can an airline or their crew fly a
plane and not not know about the crash just 5-6 months prior?

It's hard to understand things like that when you live in Western culture (or at least what's left of it.) Most of the world is full of lazy half-assed slobs. Working hard, and striving for excellence, whether people want to admit it or not, is a Post Reformation, Western cultural ideal.

Doing what you need to barely get by is the cultural norm in all other parts of world. I'm sure there are exceptions. This idea of working hard and doing your best and sticking with something until the job is done is an idea that is fading away as more people embrace global culture, and attack Western ideals.

/soapbox

 

[BugI02]

It's hard to understand things like that when you live in Western culture (or at least what's left of it.) Most of the world is full of lazy half-assed slobs. Working hard, and striving for excellence, whether people want to admit it or not, is a Post Reformation, Western cultural ideal.

Doing what you need to barely get by is the cultural norm in all other parts of world. I'm sure there are exceptions. This idea of working hard and doing your best and sticking with something until the job is done is an idea that is fading away as more people embrace global culture, and attack Western ideals.

/soapbox

Agreed, and moreover I would add that 'working hard and striving for excellence' are particularly prevalent as capitalist ideas; because in a capitalist system, more than any other, the quality of the work you do directly affects your and/or your employer's success and bottom line

 

[SheepDog4Life]

It's hard to understand things like that when you live in Western culture (or at least what's left of it.) Most of the world is full of lazy half-assed slobs. Working hard, and striving for excellence, whether people want to admit it or not, is a Post Reformation, Western cultural ideal.

Doing what you need to barely get by is the cultural norm in all other parts of world. I'm sure there are exceptions. This idea of working hard and doing your best and sticking with something until the job is done is an idea that is fading away as more people embrace global culture, and attack Western ideals.

/soapbox

I won't disagree with your assessment of the "why", I don't know the reason, but in the developing world, there simply is not the benchmark for professionalism that would be expected throughout the developed world, across the boards within professions like airline pilots, doctors, etc.

And those two airlines DID NOT train their pilots to a level of ensuring safe air travel when things go wrong. The reports of multiple system failures, multiple AOA failures, etc smacks of a similar lack of controls on the quality and training of the ground crews as well.

Boeing put out an ill-conceived system "enhancement". From basing it upon a single sensor failure to giving the control too much authority to not publishing notices of the new automated control for the new variant. The new, improved version will use both sensors, only if they agree, and provide less trim authority to the control. How the existing system got through ground testing (let alone inception and design) without Boeing knowing the amount of trim authority the system could apply is very concerning... a design and testing process failure, IMO.

However, IMO, this tragedy uncovered the lack of training standards and experienced, quality personnel for both aircrews and ground crews at both of these airlines that I think is pervasive throughout the developing world.

 

[churchmouse]

I won't disagree with your assessment of the "why", I don't know the reason, but in the developing world, there simply is not the benchmark for professionalism that would be expected throughout the developed world, across the boards within professions like airline pilots, doctors, etc.

And those two airlines DID NOT train their pilots to a level of ensuring safe air travel when things go wrong. The reports of multiple system failures, multiple AOA failures, etc smacks of a similar lack of controls on the quality and training of the ground crews as well.

Boeing put out an ill-conceived system "enhancement". From basing it upon a single sensor failure to giving the control too much authority to not publishing notices of the new automated control for the new variant. The new, improved version will use both sensors, only if they agree, and provide less trim authority to the control. How the existing system got through ground testing (let alone inception and design) without Boeing knowing the amount of trim authority the system could apply is very concerning... a design and testing process failure, IMO.

However, IMO, this tragedy uncovered the lack of training standards and experienced, quality personnel for both aircrews and ground crews at both of these airlines that I think is pervasive throughout the developing world.

Training takes time/effort and......wait for it..."MONEY" Always follow the "MONEY"